Tuesday, August 17, 2004

Inductivism and Bible Study

I recently read one biblical scholar criticize another for “simple inductivism.” The scholar being criticized was Wayne Grudem; I do not remember either the critic nor the context of the criticism. It may have been in one of those “Four Views of …” or “Five Views of … “ books, probably the one dealing with miraculous gifts.


If I am right in remembering that Grudem was the target of the criticism, then I have some inkling into its meaning. Grudem is very fond of “concordance work.” He gathers all of the relevant texts having to do with a subject, then summarizes their teaching in several points or principles. I find Grudem’s approach very helpful, and am a fan of his books. In fact, I bought every member of my family their own copies of Bible Doctrines.


The inductivism comes in, I suppose, in that Grudem is making a number of observations of data – the data of Scripture – and then drawing inferences from them. The critic does not explain what is wrong with “simple inductivism” but his tone suggested that the charge alone is enough to invalidate the conclusions drawn from such an approach. This raises a question for me, “What’s wrong with simple inductivism?” Now, I don’t have access to the scholar, probably Richard Gaffin, so I can’t get a clear explanation of what he means by simple inductivism, nor as a layman am I privy to the discussions these scholars have about interpretation, but I can draw on my past studies of philosophy to interact with such statements on my own terms.


The opposite of inductivism is some form of deductivism. Generally, inductivism is associated with empiricism and deductivism is associated with rationalism; but this is not necessarily a valid association. Hypthetico-deductivism, for example, is a form of empiricist argument. The difference between these two, instead, stands in the way they define the relationship between “general, law-like statements” and specific statements. Simple inductivism assumes that general, law-like statements, or principles, are derived from observational statements. The classic example is the inference that “all crows are black.” This general statement is derived from observations of individual crows. Principles are derived from data. With deduction, the general, law-like statement is derived through some other means -- for example, by hypothesis – and specific statements are then deduced from the principle: “all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal.” “Socrates is a man” is an observational statement. “Socrates is mortal” is a specific inference which follows logically from a general, law-like statement, the premise, and this observation. With hypothetico-deductivism, these inferred statements can be tested empirically and then either corroborate or falsify the hypothesis.


The problem with “simple inductivism” is that it simply does not work. We may record several observations of crows -- “this crow is black,” “this crow is black,” “this crow is black,” and so on – but no matter how many observations we may record, we cannot guarantee that the next crow we see won’t be white. We may argue that, if every crow ever observed is black, then the statement “all crows are black” has a high probability of being true. Inductivism leads to probabilistc inferences, not the “truth-preserving” inferences of formal logic. I don’t understand, however, how we could calculate the probability of the statement being true unless we knew what portion of the entire population of crows our observations represents. But the very problem we have supposed is that we cannot know exhaustively the entire population of crows. We cannot, therefore, calculate the probability of our inference being correct. Probability is a harsh mistress. Even if we always observe heads in a string of ten coin tosses, the probability that the next toss will be heads is still only fifty percent. Drawing general principles from these simple observations, then, is not only invalid: we don’t even know how invalid it is.


Hypothetico-deductivism is supposed to address this problem. The principle, the posed hypothesis, is a tentative explanation of observations. Some other highly improbable, but testable conclusion is then derived from the hypothesis and other statements known to be true. If the conclusion passes empirical scrutiny it then adds probable weight to the hypothesis. We can even use Bayes’ theorem to recalculate the probability of the hypothesis. However, the basic problem with this is that there are, theoretically, an infinite number of possible hypotheses to explain different observations. We could come up with all sorts of hypotheses if we were just imaginative enough. At best, all we can really do is falsify a hypothesis, but there still is an infinite number left. There is no end to the process of corroboration and falsification. The likely truthfulness of the hypothesis is actually established on different grounds: its simplicity and elegance, its explanatory power – meaning its sweep – and so on.


So, philosophy still has an unresolved problem in this area: the relationship between principles, observational statements, and specific, declarative statements. However, these are the relevant issues in biblical interpretation. The problems of the philosophy of science and Systematic Theology are analogous: the principles are the summary statements of Systematic Theology, the observational statements are the data of Scripture, and the specific, declarative statements derived from the two are the implications for us.


There is no doubt we must adopt an empiricism as we approach the Scriptures. That’s inherent in they’re being authoritative. There are no a priori principles. Everything we think and do should be derived from Scripture, at least ideally. Everything is a revelation. Even the validity of logic itself hinges on our having a rational God. And, we only know that God is rational because the Bible tells us He is. (I will leave the question alone as to how we would be able to reason about logic at all without logic.)


I still do not understand why “simple inductivism” is necessarily wrong as applied to biblical interpretation. The basic flaw with observations of crows does not hold when it comes to biblical interpretation. The Bible is self-contained. It is possible to observe all the verses in the Bible about a topic. It is possible for a single individual to read through the entire Bible, even several times in his life time. It is even more possible for a community of scholars to collectively gather all texts on a topic. And, we have incredible Bible-study software to help us. The canon of Scripture is closed; crows are born and die. The population of crows is ever changing. Scripture is unchanging, despite the constant revision of Greek New Testaments. It seems to me that an approach that consists of gathering observations – finding all relevant passages dealing with a topic – and trying to summarize them in principles is eminently correct.


I am not saying there are no problems with this approach to Systematic Theology, or topical Bible study. There are several problems. One is the problem of attention. What attracts our attention in the first place? How do we decide which are the important topics to study? And how do we determine which are the relevant verses? Don’t we already have to know what a verse means to decide whether it is relevant or not, but at the same don’t we get its meaning by comparing it to other verses on the subject? Another problem is our own prejudice or preconceptions. I’m now old enough and have enough experience to know that certain communities of believers have their own cherished interpretations of verses, which mold their thinking and are unquestioned. One of the things that always amazes me is that I quote John 3:16 in the King James. I have never read a King James Bible. I have used the New American Standard since 1973, thirty-one years. I have read John 3:16 hundreds of times; it is not that I’ve never read it. My pastors have never preached from the King James Version. Yet, that is the version that is most often quoted in the evangelical community, and it is the version I can quote from memory. Now, if even the wording I use to recite a text is determined by my involvement with the evangelical community, it’s almost certain that my selection and interpretation of texts is similarly determined.


However, these problems would be common, I believe, to any alternative to “simple inductivism” as well, and would be worse. It seems to me that adopting a hypothetico-deductive or a rationalist scheme as a more realistic, and thus desirable, approach leaves the way open to flights of human imagination and a bad kind of dogmatism. It would have to accord authority to dogma or tradition that should be reserved only for Scripture. The argument in favor of such an approach is that it explicitly recognizes the problems of attention, prejudice and preconception in interpretation. The dogmatic system functions as a working hypothesis which is then constantly tested by individual observations of biblical texts. This makes sense – and is probably close to what I actually do with my use of commentaries and Confessions – but it still seems to me that we should strive for a different ideal. We should pursue the ideal of gathering all verses related to a topic and trying to derive summary principles from them. Apart from that we give up too much. We make falsification of hypotheses less likely. The discovery of biblical topics, themes, and assertions that challenge our existing views would be less frequent. We would rule out too much a priori, as does the critic with miraculous gifts.


So, the conclusion I draw from this rant, is that I will make “inductivism” a goal. I will continue to try to gather an exhaustive collection of biblical observations on a topic (with the help of my software) and derive principles from them. I will apply my own dogmatic commitments (Reformed, Baptist, Charismatic) to organize my materials, conceding the need for a "hypothesis" in selecting texts, but I will also continually test my resulting outlines against my observations. For example, I am tentatively using a modified ordo salutis to organize my presentation of the ministry of the Spirit in the lives of believers, but I will review my list of 539 biblical texts on the Spirit’s ministry to ensure that this outline makes sense.

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